The Problem with Predators by Carbone, June & Black, William K.
 441 
The Problem with Predators 
June Carbone and William K. Black 
ABSTRACT 
Both corporate theory and sex discrimination law start with 
presumptions that CEOs seek to advance legitimate ends and design the 
internal organization of business enterprises to achieve such ends. Yet, a 
growing literature questions why CEOs and boards of directors 
nonetheless select for Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and 
toxic masculinity, despite the downsides associated with these 
traits. Three scholarly literatures—economics, criminology, and gender 
theory—draw on advances in psychology to shed new light on the 
construction of seemingly dysfunctional corporate cultures. They start by 
questioning the assumption that CEOs—even CEOs of seemingly 
mainstream businesses—necessarily seek to advance “legitimate” ends. 
Instead, they suggest that a persistent issue is predation: the exploitation 
of asymmetries in information and power to the disadvantage of 
shareholders, creditors, customers, or employees. These literatures then 
explore how such CEOs may rationally choose to employ seemingly 
dysfunctional practices, such as “masculinity contests,” which reward 
employees more likely to buy into ethically dubious activities that range 
from predatory lending to sexual harassment. This Article maintains that 
questioning the presumption of legitimacy has profound and largely 
unexplored implications for corporate theory and anti-discrimination 
law. It extends the theory of “control fraud” central to white-collar 
criminology to a new concept of “control predation” that includes conduct 
that is ethically objectionable, if not necessarily illegal. This Article 
concludes that only by questioning the legitimacy of these practices in 
business terms can gender theory adequately address women’s workplace 
equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Both corporate theory and sex discrimination law start with 
presumptions that business models seek to advance legitimate ends, and 
that the internal organization of business enterprises reflect reasonable 
efforts to achieve such ends. Yet, a growing literature questions why 
businesses nonetheless select for traits in their executives, such as “over-
optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical 
self-deception,”1 despite long-standing evidence demonstrating the 
downsides of these traits. Three scholarly literatures shed new light on the 
construction of seemingly dysfunctional corporate cultures. They start by 
questioning the assumption that businesses, even seemingly mainstream 
businesses, seek to advance “legitimate” ends, and seek to identify, 
instead, the hallmarks of business cultures that advance unscrupulous or 
predatory ends.2 They then explore how such cultures may rationally 
choose to employ seemingly dysfunctional practices, such as “masculinity 
contests,” that reward employees more likely to buy into ethically dubious 
activities that range from predatory lending to sexual harassment.3 In this 
Article, we will maintain that questioning the presumption of “legitimacy” 
has profound and largely unexplored implications for corporate theory and 
anti-discrimination law. 
Three bodies of work in economics, criminology, and gender theory 
lay the foundation for our analysis. 
First, new work in economics maintains that some companies may 
adopt business models that depend on the use of manipulation and 
deception to exploit customers and employees, and that such practices may 
persist over time because they are so successful and profitable. In 2015, 
George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, both Nobel Laureates, published 
Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. The 
book draws on the authors’ more technical work in economics to argue, in 
terms accessible to a popular audience, that economic predation can 
become a pervasive practice and that it can come to dominate entire market 
sectors. While neoclassical economics assumes that markets will police 
deceptive practices and corporate shareholders will depress the share 
prices of companies that systematically fleece customers, Akerlof and 
                                                     
 1. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent 
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 
GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004). 
 2. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Repugnant Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research 
and Policy Agenda, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 973 (2017). 
 3. See Jennifer L. Berdahl et al., Work as a Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422, 422 
(2018). 
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Shiller demonstrate that the opposite can also be true: if companies can 
prosper by cheating, they may drive more honest players from the market.4 
Second, this work complements that of white-collar criminologists, 
who also study predatory business practices, and explains how they can 
take hold and persist in seemingly legitimate businesses. The 
criminologists have shown how deceptive practices, such as the type of 
predatory mortgage lending that led to the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), 
can become pervasive in an industry, persuading more conventional 
lenders to either adopt similar tactics or depart the field. Criminologists, 
borrowing a phrase from Akerlof’s earlier work, describe the way that 
fraudulent firms drive more honest ones from the market as a “Gresham’s 
dynamic,” in which unscrupulous practices become so profitable that they 
place more ethical lenders at a competitive disadvantage.5 The 
criminologists further explain how the head of the company (the CEO) can 
create powerful, perverse incentives that create a “criminogenic” 
environment that normalizes the use of such predatory tactics.6 Finally, 
criminologists emphasize that the key to the success of such business 
models is their seeming legitimacy.7 
Third, a new body of work in gender theory links gender disparities 
in hiring, promotion, and wages to predatory business models.8 Of the ten 
occupations with the largest pay gap between men and women, four are in 
the finance industry, including the top category—financial advisors.9 The 
literature on personal financial advisors has become increasingly critical 
of the conflicts of interest that arise from tying advisers’ income to the 
commissions they generate for selling products with high fees that may 
not necessarily be in their clients’ interests. 10 Recent studies also show 
that male financial advisors are more likely to commit misconduct than 
                                                     
 4. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF 
MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION 164 (2015) (describing failure to deal with consequences of 
deception and trickery); see also description of “Gresham’s dynamic,” infra note 5 and accompanying 
text (describing how disreputable dealers can drive honest dealers from the market). 
 5. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). 
 6. See WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 3, 5 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter BLACK, 
BEST WAY]. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing 
Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425 (2018) [hereinafter Cahn et al., 
Gender and the Tournament]; see also June Carbone, Naomi Cahn & Nancy Levit, Women, Rule-
Breaking, and The Triple Bind, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 9. See Catherine Clifford, These 10 Jobs Have the Largest and Smallest Pay Gaps Between Men 
and Women, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/09/the-10-jobs-with-the-largest-
and-smallest-gender-pay-gaps.html [https://perma.cc/N5HN-NQ4V]. 
 10. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181 (2017). 
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female advisors but are less likely to be fired as a result of it.11 The result 
creates a triple bind that limits women’s success if they do not engage in 
the same behavior as the men, punishing them more severely when they 
do, and discouraging them from applying, in part because of prior 
women’s lack of success in the enterprise.12 Anti-discrimination suits, 
however, tend to take practices, such as commissions tied to unjustifiable 
fees, at face value.13 If the lawsuits were to examine the connections 
between the predatory business models and the impact on female 
employees, they might find that the environments most hostile to women 
also display other dubious practices. The business case for diversity 
suggests that greater diversity improves firm performance,14 but the 
studies finding an empirical correlation between diversity and 
performance have yet to explain which way the causal arrows run. This 
Article suggests that the key to both greater diversity and improved 
business performance may be ethical teamwork. Yet, the role of teamwork 
and collaboration generally as the link between the two is rarely examined. 
Taken together, these three bodies of work shed new light on what 
seem to be dysfunctional corporate cultures and the challenges they pose 
to corporate theory and anti-discrimination law. As Milton Friedman 
observes, standard corporate theory assumes that responsible business 
executives, at a minimum, obey the law and, more robustly, that market 
forces encourage ethical practices.15 Yet, modern economic theory 
demonstrates that markets may, in fact, promote unscrupulous practices in 
the face of legal laxity, laxity in enforcement, or simply difficulty in 
detection.16 This, in turn, casts the almost century-long debate on 
stakeholder theory in a different light.17 Engaging in shady practices may, 
in fact, increase shareholder value, at least in the short to medium term, at 
the expense of long-term shareholder and societal interests. In addition, 
                                                     
 11. Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in 
Punishing Misconduct 2–3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 19–047, 2017), https://www.hbs. 
edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/19-047_be957781-c55c-4be0-994d-a29875374f32.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/R5F6-8JU5]. 
 12. See Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8, at 447. 
 13. Id. at 437 (arguing that courts rarely examine the legitimacy of business practices that 
disadvantage women). 
 14. Marcus Noland, Tyler Moran & Barbara Kotschwar, Is Gender Diversity Profitable? 
Evidence from a Global Survey 3 (Peterson Inst. for Int.’l Econ., Working Paper No. 16-3, 2016); 
Aimee Picchi, In Business, More Women at the Top Means More Profits, CBS NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-women-more-profits/ [https://perma.cc/A5CN-3BHT]. 
 15. Milton Friedman, A Friedman doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase 
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
 16. Cf. Akerlof, supra note 5, at 495. 
 17. See generally Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate 
Governance Reform in Context, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001 (2013) (summarizing the debate over 
corporate purposes). 
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these practices may also correspond to insular and dysfunctional corporate 
cultures, linked to various kinds of in-group favoritism, without the 
practices being actionable in accordance with conventional 
anti-discrimination doctrines.18 
These conclusions suggest that a rethinking of the core assumptions 
of market theory and their relationship to corporate stakeholder doctrine 
and anti-discrimination law are long overdue. 
I. PREDATION, STAKEHOLDERS, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
Over the course of more than a century, corporate legal theorists have 
debated the question of whose interests corporations should serve: that of 
their shareholders or a broader group of stakeholders including workers, 
customers, and the broader community.19 In the context of this debate, 
theorists have assumed that corporations generally pursue legitimate 
ends20 but differ on the question of how corporations should approach 
ethically dubious practices. 
 In the background of that debate are two issues. First, which 
corporate abuses are the most concerning? In every era, theorists have 
viewed predation, defined as the exploitation of asymmetries in 
information and power through manipulation and deceit,21 as a problem to 
be addressed. And in every era, theorists have been concerned with the 
potential for corporate form to be used as a means to exacerbate 
asymmetries in power and information while insulating managers from 
accountability.22 But the theorists have not agreed on the priorities they 
assign to different types of potential abuses. 
Second, how do internal corporate management and external 
regulation relate to each other? Predation typically involves a group of 
insiders using corporate form to exploit “outsiders,” who may be 
                                                     
 18. See Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament, supra note 8. 
 19. O’Kelley, supra note 17, at 1002 (tracing the history from the Civil War forward). 
 20. Historically, however, a counter-narrative has also existed that sees corporations as 
instruments for criminality. See, e.g., 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 741 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1776) (warning of manager’s abuse of “other 
people’s money”); see also Stanton Wheeler & Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The Organization as 
Weapon in White-Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1403 (1982). 
 21. See, e.g., AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 4, at 164 (observing that modern economics 
“inherently fails to grapple with deception and trickery. People’s naivete and susceptibility to 
deception have been swept under the rug”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: 
The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 28 
(2001) (noting that because of the risk of corruption, prominent underwriters refused until the end of 
the nineteenth century to underwrite the common stock of industrial corporations); Edwin H. 
Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 3 (1940) (discussing role of corporate 
deceit). 
 22. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 20, at 741. 
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employees, customers, creditors, minority shareholders, or the public.23 
Should there be a clear demarcation between the fiduciary duties officers 
owe shareholders and external regulation for the protection of external 
stakeholders, of employees, customers, and the general public? Or should 
both types of constraints on managerial freedom of action be thought of 
together? 
To explore these ideas, this Part will set forth the positions of Adolf 
Berle, Milton Friedman, George Akelof, and Robert Shiller. Berle’s 
primary concern involved the role of control blocks, consisting of 
dominant shareholders and managers, who misused power to disadvantage 
individual shareholders, minority shareholders as a group, and by 
extension, the larger public. Friedman, writing in a different era, opposed 
the ability of managers to advance their own political or social values at 
the expense of shareholders’ interest in profit maximization. Akerlof and 
Shiller express their greatest concern about business models in which the 
exploitation of the others is a primary objective. These theorists 
nonetheless agree that predation is an issue of concern and that internal 
governance and external regulation tend to reinforce each other in 
creating—and potentially combatting—abuses. 
A. Round One: Berle and Means 
Adolf Berle’s work framed the issue, taking the position that so long 
as corporations exercised the type of power that made them akin to 
principalities, they should have obligations to a greater group of 
stakeholders than merely shareholders interested in maximizing profits or 
share prices. In taking this position, Berle’s principal concern focused on 
the abuses of a control group of dominant shareholders and managers, who 
exercised power over the corporation, often to the detriment of individual 
shareholders and minority shareholders as a group.24 As one commentator 
of the period observed, “the fat boys, no longer content with their ancient 
perquisite of milking the public, are now engaged in the dizzy and lofty 
job of squeezing their own shareholders dry!”25 Berle, however, saw the 
consequences of predation on shareholders as affecting not just the 
shareholders themselves but also the larger community. In his influential 
volume with Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, the authors wrote that: 
                                                     
 23. See, e.g., AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 4, at 2–3, 23–45 (providing examples that range 
from Cinnabon enticing customers with hard to resist aromas to accounting fraud). 
 24. ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 244–52 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. revised ed., 1968) (1932) (describing individual 
shareholders’ diminished power within the corporation). 
 25. Stuart Chase, Professor Quixote, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 1927, at 263. 
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The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a 
giant corporation is a tremendous force [that] can harm or benefit a 
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of 
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The 
organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm 
of private enterprise—they have become more nearly social 
institutions.26 
Berle accordingly argued that both fiduciary duties owed to internal 
stakeholders and external regulations, such as disclosure requirements, 
should be designed to curb such practices to promote shareholder value 
and the larger public good. Thus, in his classic debate with Merrick Dodd, 
he maintained that only fiduciary duties to shareholders, and not duties to 
a larger group of stakeholders, provided a sufficiently determinant legal 
standard to make enforcement realistic and mangers accountable.27 Berle 
did not take this position because he necessarily favored maximizing 
returns for shareholders as the sole acceptable corporate purpose; instead, 
he saw such a standard as the only practical way to restrain managerial 
power.28 
In describing corporations this way, Berle and Means saw legal 
regulation as more than a matter of privately enforceable fiduciary duties. 
Instead, they suggested that the ambit for oversight should follow the 
nature and power of the institutions, inviting a farther-reaching regulatory 
approach. The authors questioned whether, given the increased 
concentration of power in modern corporations, the ends of the company 
should be thought of, not as the maximization of profits, but as a “purely 
neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the 
community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the 
basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”29 Public oversight 
should thus seek both to protect individual shareholders from the control 
group and to advance public ends. 
                                                     
 26. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 46. 
 27. See Adolf A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 
(1931); Adolf A. Berle Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365, 1367–68 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees] (responding 
to E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153 
(1932), arguing that corporate managers should be seen as answerable to a broader group of 
stakeholders). 
 28. See, e.g., Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, supra note 27, at 1367. Berle 
observed that when management’s fiduciary obligations to shareholders weaken, “the management 
and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute.” Id. 
 29. See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and 
the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 353–
56 (2013).  
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Finally, in his later work, Berle argued that corporate managers 
should have the discretion to take broader social interests into account and 
that fiduciary duties should be interpreted in that light.30 By the time he 
adopted this position in 1959, however, corporations were widely seen as 
adopting such an approach, in part, because of the greater power of unions 
and the state limiting management power.31 
Berle, thus, saw corporate governance and legal regulation as 
operating in tandem; to the extent corporate power implicated a broader 
set of interests, the corporation had a duty to take those interests into 
account, and regulation of the corporation was considered appropriate in 
order to protect those interests. He argued that the concentration of power 
in the modern corporation was too great to expect markets to police either 
obligations to shareholders or to the broader community.32 
B. Round Two: Milton Friedman 
By 1970, Berle’s notion that the modern corporation should be 
governed in accordance with public policy objectives rather than “private 
cupidity” was under attack. Milton Friedman lodged an early assault.33 
In his 1962 volume on Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman, in a 
manner not so different from Berle’s description of corporate fiduciary 
duties, saw maximizing shareholder profits as a concrete and determinant 
standard and saw alternative managerial objectives as subjective, 
inconsistent, and lacking any meaningful economic guidance.34 Friedman, 
however, did not just see maximizing shareholder profits as a legal 
standard for fiduciary obligations; he saw it as the principle executives 
should use in guiding corporations. He wrote, “Few trends could so 
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the 
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to 
                                                     
 30. See ADOLF A. BERLE JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 107–10 (1959). 
 31. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF 
COUNTERVAILING POWER, 141–57 (1952) (explaining the role of unions as a countervailing power); 
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 140–48 (1967) (describing rise of the 
“technostructure” as opposed to profit maximization). 
 32. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 282–85. 
 33. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 679 (1986) (citing Friedman’s New 
York Times essay and calling it “[p]erhaps the most notable justification of the strict profit-
maximizing goal”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends 
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 564 (2003) (“Milton Friedman’s famous essay on 
corporate responsibility remains the classic statement of the shareholder primacy model.”); Ronald 
Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate 
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 149 (2004) (summarizes reaction to Friedman). 
 34. See Thomas J. Horton, Restoring American Antitrust’s Moral Arc, 62 S.D. L. REV. 11, 15 
(2017); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) (objecting to the 
managerial system as allowing managers to impose their value preferences on investors). 
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make as much money for their stockholders as possible.”35 Friedman 
objected to corporate managers imposing their own values (or the values 
of other stakeholders) on shareholders.36 
Friedman acknowledged, however, that a business is justified in 
maximizing profits only so long as it “stays . . . within the rules of the 
game” and “engages in open and free competition, without deception or 
fraud.”37 This analysis raised a potential problem for his theory. 
Government regulation ordinarily set “the rule of the game,” the terms that 
determine “open and free competition,” and the definitions of the practices 
that constitute “deception or fraud.”38 Were business executives therefore 
compelled to engage in practices that added to profits right up to the letter 
of the law, exploiting legally gray areas, however odious?39 And if so, did 
that invite regulators to act more aggressively to protect other 
stakeholders, such as employees or customers, since Friedman argued that 
business executives should not take their interests into consideration 
unless the law required it?40 
To address these issues, Friedman amended his initial statement in 
an op-ed in the New York Times in 1970, advocating shareholder primacy. 
He wrote: “[A] corporate executive[’s] . . . responsibility is to conduct the 
business in accordance with [shareholders’] desires, which generally will 
                                                     
 35. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 133. 
 36. See Fulton Friedman, A Friednzan Doctrine , N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at SM 17, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-
business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/7DVQ-PPH6] (giving the example of making “expenditures on 
reducing pollution beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the corporation or that is required 
by law in order to contribute to the social objective of improving the environment” as an illustration 
of managers imposing values on shareholders that they might not share). 
 37. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 133. 
 38. See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton, Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost Values, 16 U.N.H.L. REV. 179, 
241 (2018) (arguing that “competitive fairness, level economic playing fields, economic justice, a 
healthy diversity of competitors, and reduced economic concentration are actually crucial economic 
values in the sense that they provide the foundational underpinnings for a healthy, stable, and 
sustainable capitalistic economic system” and should be seen as the appropriate subject of antitrust 
law). “Deception and fraud” as criminal acts are defined by criminal statutes, though they may be also 
be actionable as part of common civil actions. For a discussion of the tensions between the legal 
definition of fraud as a crime and ethical and civil definitions of wrongful deceptive acts, see infra 
notes 69–76 and accompanying text, and see also Horton, supra note 34, at 239–42 (discussing the 
implications for antitrust law). 
 39. See Friedman, supra note 36 (indeed, his example of a corporation spending more for 
pollution control than the law requires suggests such a result). 
 40. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 33, at 30–32 (noting the existence of extensive regulation 
addressing workers, consumers, and other stakeholders); Chen & Hanson, supra note 33, at 55–57 
(describing how shareholder primacy can coexist with protection of other stakeholder interests through 
legal or social protections outside of the business); Christopher Cosans, Does Milton Friedman 
Support a Vigorous Business Ethics?, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 391, 391, 395 (2009) (“Several scholars have 
argued that Friedman asserts that businesses have no or minimal social duties beyond compliance with 
the law.”). 
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be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules 
of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom.”41 This later statement does two things. It further acknowledges 
that corporate executives do have ethical responsibilities not to maximize 
profits at any cost; Friedman did not endorse unscrupulous predatory 
practices. In addition, by rooting these “basic rules of the society” not just 
in law, but in ethical customs, he could deflect calls for more regulation. 
Indeed, Friedman, at the same time that he argued that corporate 
executives should not take into account any interests other than 
shareholder profits, also maintained that free market principles, not 
regulation, provided the best protection for other interests. With respect to 
consumers, for example, he and Rose Friedman wrote that “market 
competition, when it is permitted to work, protects the consumer better 
than do the alternative government mechanisms that have been 
increasingly superimposed on the market.”42 Other free market advocates 
maintain that reputational interests will protect against shoddy products or 
oppressive working conditions.43 
In Friedman’s view, advocacy for shareholder primacy, therefore, 
need not be inconsistent with ethical behavior.44 And to the extent 
individual companies might be tempted to cut corners, fleece customers, 
or oppress employees, market mechanisms and private intermediaries 
could be expected to respond, tarnishing the reputation of the 
perpetrators.45 In Friedman’s world, therefore, neither private fiduciary 
obligations to nonshareholder stakeholders nor public intervention were 
necessary to restrain private cupidity. 
C. Round 3: Akerlof and Shiller 
George Akerlof won the Nobel Prize in 2001 for his work on “lemons 
markets,”46 that is, markets that sell defective or low-quality products. 
Akerlof’s article began what economists call the “information revolution,” 
which involves the rejection of the assumption that markets incorporate 
                                                     
 41. See Friedman, supra note 36. 
 42. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 222 
(1980). 
 43. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL 
ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 157–72 (Paul Zak ed., 2008) (discussing the degree to which 
markets take ethics into account); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 280, 283 (1991) (arguing that “a rule against fraud is not 
an essential or even necessarily an important ingredient of securities markets”). 
 44. See Cosans, supra note 40, at 394–96. 
 45. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 33, at 55–57 (describing how shareholder primacy can 
coexist with protection of other stakeholder interests through legal or social protections outside of the 
business). 
 46. See generally Akerlof, supra note 5 (noting Akerlof’s work on “lemons” in the market). 
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perfect information.47 Instead, Akerlof, both in his 1970 article and in his 
more recent work with Robert Shiller, explores the way that markets deal 
with “asymmetrical information,” that is, where one party has 
substantially more information than another party. This work challenges 
the conventional wisdom that markets police fraud and misrepresentation. 
Instead, Akerlof describes circumstances in which asymmetrical 
information makes predatory behavior profitable and market forces—
rather than counter such behavior—encourage it, driving honest 
competitors out of the market. 
To illustrate his point, Akerlof initially focused on used car markets 
as an example of the impact of asymmetrical information. In these 
markets, used car dealers are in a position to know more about the cars 
they are selling than customers do. They are also in a position to disguise 
the quality of the cars they hawk by withholding information, covering up 
defects, or illegally resetting odometers.48 Before Akerlof’s article, 
economists assumed that consumers could detect quality, or if quality was 
difficult to determine, dealers could distinguish their products by offering 
guarantees of quality, such as extended warranties or reliable third parties 
to provide assistance.49 
Akerlof challenged this conventional wisdom in two critical ways. 
First, he introduced and named the “Gresham’s dynamic,” one of the most 
important concepts in both economics and white-collar criminology.50 
Akerlof explained the perverse result: “[D]ishonest dealings tend to drive 
honest dealings out of the market.”51 In plain English, market forces make 
fraud and predation endemic. Rather than market forces producing ways 
to detect fraud or facilitating the segmentation of the market into 
higher-quality and lower-quality goods, market forces could instead lower 
the quality of products in the entire market. Second, Akerlof demonstrated 
that no particular outcome was inevitable. One possible outcome was that 
the market for high quality goods could fail entirely. Consumers, unable 
to determine with certainty whether they were buying “lemons,” would 
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pay much less for used cars than new cars, driving honest dealers selling 
higher quality used cars out of the market entirely.52 
Akerlof reports that he initially had trouble getting the article 
published. In rejecting the article that would eventually contribute to 
Akerlof’s Nobel Prize in Economics, the editors of The American 
Economic Review and The Review of Economic Studies explained that 
their journals “did not publish papers on subjects of such triviality.”53 
Akerlof and Robert Shiller wrote Phishing for Phools: The Economics of 
Manipulation and Deception to demonstrate that the problem of 
asymmetric information was one of more general application than merely 
the used car market. The book argues that markets generally do not 
necessarily promote the greater good. Instead, the free-market system 
systematically exploits our weaknesses and “manipulate[s] us through our 
subconscious.”54 The authors describe deception as everything from the 
way Cinnabon uses enticing aromas to lure airport travelers into its stores 
to rating agencies that contributed to the financial system boom and bust 
of the last decade.55 Their overall conclusion is that businesses routinely 
rely on predation, manipulation, and exploitation of psychological 
predispositions to fatten the bottom line.56 Joseph Stiglitz explained the 
potentially far-reaching implications: 
In markets with some, but imperfect competition, firms strive to 
increase their market power and to increase the extraction of rents 
from existing market power, giving rise to widespread distortions. In 
such circumstances, institutions and the rules of the game matter. 
Public policy is critical in setting the rules of the game.57 
Stiglitz concluded further that the role of asymmetric information in 
preventing “perfect competition” means that markets may not be efficient 
and that correcting the problems that arise may be complex and costly.58 
In the meantime, the distributional effects can be significant, allowing 
those in a position to exploit asymmetries in information and market power 
                                                     
 52. Id. at 489–90. 
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to profit handsomely at the expense of others, thereby undermining the 
effectiveness of the market as a whole.59 
This recharacterization poses a challenge to both elements of 
Friedman’s argument for shareholder profit maximization. First, it 
suggests that markets are unlikely to police corporate ethics. Akerlof and 
Shiller argue that, in many cases, the dividing line between ethically 
justifiable and illegal practices will be on a continuum, creating incentives 
to exploit gray areas, and, even where the dividing line is clear, market 
forces may make it impossible to compete in some markets without 
crossing those lines.60 At the height of the mortgage boom, for example, 
an honest home appraiser may have found herself without many 
customers. Second, any suggestion that corporate officers and directors 
have a duty to maximize shareholder returns within such markets 
inevitably invites unethical behavior. And a call for deregulation makes 
things worse, since it might further blur the lines between ethically 
acceptable and unacceptable actions and make it harder for honest firms 
to compete at all, much less maximize profits, without engaging in 
unethical behavior. Friedman, of course, in his discussion of market 
regulation with co-author Rose Friedman, assumed that consumers might 
prefer cheaper options, even if it meant lesser quality.61 Akerlof 
demonstrated, however, that if the consumer cannot determine quality, the 
effect may be what Friedman opposed: fewer consumer options.62 In a 
lemons market, both the reputable seller, who might prefer to supply 
higher-quality goods at higher prices, and the consumer, who would prefer 
to buy such goods, would be at a disadvantage and could be driven from 
the market.63 Indeed, Akerlof began his lemons markets article observing 
that asymmetric information is a major reason why many consumers buy 
only new cars, creating a dramatically greater price differential between 
new and used cars than differences in average quality alone might 
warrant.64 Akerlof’s publication of these points in his August 1970 
article made Friedman’s position on profit maximization via 
predation untenable. Friedman responded promptly in his 
September 13, 1970 op ed by stating that CEOs had an ethical duty 
not to predate. 
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Friedman’s defenders can and have objected to such claims as 
imprecise or paternalistic.65 Some even object that they enjoy Cinnabon. 
Akelof and Shiller argue, however, that the consequences are not always 
as benign as one thousand extra calories, noting the increased intensity of 
financial crises and their aftermaths, the threat from potentially dangerous 
drugs, and the systemic effects that might occur from undermining overall 
confidence in markets.66 
The issues we explore here, though, involve the consequences for 
business cultures. If, in fact, markets not only fail to deter, but also actively 
encourage unethical behavior, how does that affect internal management? 
And does the answer change if predation depends on deception, that is, on 
maintaining the appearance of legitimate business purposes and cloaking 
the predatory nature of certain practices? At a minimum, this analysis 
suggests that fiduciary duties alone cannot address the issue and that a 
single-minded focus on profit maximization can make things worse. 
D. Predation and Corporate Management 
The possibility that corporate form can be an aid to predation changes 
the discussion of business purposes and the parameters of shareholder 
value. While theorists such as Milton Friedman and Joseph Stiglitz did not 
agree on much, they both recognized the dangers of predation and agreed 
that the limit on profit maximization should be an observation of standard 
ethical practices. Stiglitz recognizes that sustaining such ethical practices 
is not easy to do; Friedman largely ignored the question of the source of 
“ethical custom.” If, as Akerlof and Shiller suggest, markets promote 
predation or ethically dubious practices more generally, these practices 
necessarily affect the understandings of corporate governance. The next 
Part examines the implications for understanding the construction of 
corporate cultures. 
II. PREDATION, CRIMINOLOGY AND CORPORATE CULTURES 
White-collar criminologists have always recognized the possibility 
that corporations could be used as instruments of predation,67 and, indeed, 
the traditional efforts to define white-collar crime incorporate concepts 
very similar to Akerlof and Shiller’s models of predation. In his 
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presidential address to the American Sociological Association, Edwin 
Sutherland defined white-collar criminology as a distinct field, arguing 
that white-collar crime consists principally of the “violation of delegated 
or implied trust,” most typically in the form of misrepresentation of asset 
values or duplicity in the manipulation of power.68 In addition, Sutherland 
recognized that, like predation generally, notions of corporate wrong-
doing often straddle the line between legal and illegal.69 He emphasized 
that the challenge for those who would study the relationship between 
business entities and crime is the fact that so much of business wrongdoing 
is either not criminal or not viewed as criminal even when it violates the 
law, frustrating precise definitions of the phenomena.70 
In the years since, modern criminology has focused on the role of the 
enterprise in white-collar crime, creating a structure for the examination 
of corporate cultures primed to engage in predation. The modern era starts 
with Stanton Wheeler and Mitchell Lewis Rothman’s seminal article, The 
Organization as Weapon in White-Collar Crime.71 Wheeler and Rothman 
argued that “the organization, size and profitably notwithstanding, is for 
white-collar criminals what the gun or knife is for the common criminal—
a tool to obtain money from victims.”72 They emphasize that “the 
organizational form itself, and public perceptions warped by image-
making, combine to give the organization a heightened sense of 
legitimacy.”73 
Later scholars would build on Wheeler and Rothman’s insights to 
argue that corporate form plays a critical role in the seeming legitimacy of 
the enterprise and the ability to create the trust that Sutherland described 
as critical to understanding white-collar crime.74 This work distinguishes 
white-collar crime, or fraud that employs the organization itself as a 
weapon, from fraud committed by rogue traders or embezzlers and shows 
that the dollar losses from the former are dramatically greater.75 The most 
recent work in criminology has focused on the mechanisms that allow 
organizations to become “weapons” of wrongdoing, describing the 
creation of corporate cultures that facilitate predation and rule breaking, if 
not necessarily outright criminality.76 
                                                     
 68. Sutherland, supra note 21, at 3.   69. Id. at 1–3. 
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This Part will consider these mechanisms as they relate to predation. 
First, the Part will start with the concept of “control fraud” and “control 
predation,” that is, a description of how fraud (and by extension predation) 
orchestrated from the top of a corporation differs from such activities 
undertaken by individuals. Second, it will note the importance of the 
appearance of legitimacy in conducting the activities. Third, it will 
examine the role of performance pay in creating incentives that encourage 
predatory conduct while preserving the appearance of legitimacy. Fourth, 
it will consider the combination of shareholder primacy and short-termism 
in encouraging the practices. Fifth, it will link these practices to corporate 
tolerance for seemingly dysfunctional behavior, such as the tolerance of 
arrogant and ineffective managers. Finally, it will link these practices to 
the traditional consideration of conflicts between corporations and other 
stakeholders and conclude that the modern emphasis on shareholder value 
combines with the relaxation of ethical constraints on predation to shape 
corporate cultures. 
A. Control Fraud and Predation 
The term “control fraud” refers to the use of the firm as a “weapon” 
for corruption or criminality.77 For control fraud, those in charge of the 
firm (referred to as a matter of convenience as the CEOs) are necessarily 
complicit.78 Indeed, control frauds typically occur because the CEO 
creates a “criminogenic environment,” that is, one conducive to criminal 
or duplicitous behavior.79 The CEO is particularly poised to create such 
environments through: 
 Optimizing the firm’s operations and structures for fraud; 
 Setting a corrupt tone at the top, suborning internal controls, and 
recruiting employees, officers, and internal and external 
‘controls’ as allies; 
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 Converting firm assets for the CEO’s personal benefit through 
seemingly normal corporate compensation mechanisms;80 and 
 Optimizing the external environment for control fraud, e.g., by 
using firm resources to lobby for favorable regulatory 
environments.81 
Control fraud, thus, involves organizations where the CEO 
deliberately primes the organization to engage in unscrupulous conduct, 
and the corporate culture reflects these efforts. 
Predation differs from fraud in that it is not necessarily illegal. In the 
context of used car markets, for example, resetting an odometer violates 
the law.82 Persuading car buyers to take out a loan with an above-market 
interest rate ordinarily does not.83 The ethics underlying the practices, 
however, may not be terribly different whether the practices involve 
technical legal violations or not. Both may involve targeting naïve or 
vulnerable customers and exploiting asymmetries in information.84 Each 
practice may involve the failure to disclose information that the dealer 
knows that the customer would find valuable, though, in the case of the 
loans, dealers may stop short of engaging in the kind of active 
misrepresentation that would constitute actionable fraud. Finally, both 
involve developing a degree of rapport with the customer that encourages 
trust in circumstances where the dealer intends to betray that trust by 
selling the customer a product (in this case a high-interest loan) that 
benefits the dealer at the expense of the customer.85 And, the harm from 
predation may be similar to, if not greater than, the harm from outright 
illegality.86 
Moreover, CEOs (or other top executives) can create a firm culture 
encouraging these activities while deliberately insulating themselves from 
knowledge of the particular acts of their employees. Take, for example, 
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Goldman Sachs’s activities during the financial crisis, which encouraged 
a firm culture that incentivized customer deception without accountability 
for top executives. Goldman’s CEO openly joked about treating the firm’s 
clients as “adversaries,”87 demonstrating awareness of the culture. In 2012, 
Greg Smith, a former Goldman Vice President, described this mindset as 
a pervasive part of the firm’s culture. He observed that traders prized the 
quickest ways to make money at the firm and termed one “hunting 
elephants,” which involved targeting the most unsophisticated clients who 
could be deceived into generating the biggest profits for Goldman.88 Smith 
stated, “It makes me ill how callously people talk about ripping their 
clients off.”89 
Consider, in turn, how such a culture could encourage such activities 
without top executives running afoul of the legal standard for fraud cases. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) brought a civil securities fraud action against 
Goldman Sachs and one of its employees, Fabrice Tourre, a midlevel 
trader in his twenties.90 The SEC charges involved misleading a German 
bank about the quality of the securities Tourre sold at a time when 
Goldman believed that the housing market was beginning to collapse.91 
The press described Tourre as “the lowest man on the totem pole.”92 The 
SEC targeted Tourre personally because he described his role in the project 
in emails to his girlfriend, bragging that he sold toxic mortgage bonds to 
“widows and orphans that I ran into at the airport.”93 The SEC complaint 
alleged that Tourre had “put together a complicated financial product that 
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was secretly designed to maximize the likelihood that it would fail, and 
marketed and sold it to investors without appropriate disclosure,”94 
resulting in approximately $1 billion in losses.95 The SEC did not bring 
individual charges against Tourre’s supervisors because the SEC could not 
prove that they knew the particulars that made Tourre’s actions 
fraudulent.96 The SEC settled its institutional case against Goldman but 
won its civil case against Tourre at trial.97 
A firm culture that encourages selling arcane financial products to 
unwitting customers, awards outsized bonuses for doing so, and provides 
little direct oversight encourages these activities. Individual employees 
like Tourre make the final call on which legal or ethical lines to cross.98 
To the extent that upper management engineers the culture, sets the terms 
for the bonuses, and determines the level of oversight—including the 
practices that insulate senior managers from knowledge of the details—
this is control fraud. In the Tourre case, there is certainly evidence that 
Goldman encouraged its employees to unload mortgage-backed securities 
in the early days of the financial crisis.99 Goldman, after all, profited 
handsomely from the fees Tourre generated in this and any number of 
similar transactions.100 And even if the SEC charged Goldman as an 
institution with securities fraud, the executives who benefitted from 
Tourre’s actions faced no individual liability. True “rogue traders” more 
typically enrich themselves at company expense.101 
The idea of control fraud also emphasizes the power of the CEO at 
the expense of other corporate players, including shareholders. 
Consideration of CEO power in the abstract can, however, be misleading. 
The traditional debate in corporate theory is between the managerial age 
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CEO, who is characterized as having more autonomy in the operation of 
the company, versus the shareholder value era CEO, who is subject to a 
greater degree of oversight by corporate boards protecting shareholder 
interests.102 This debate, however, involves different issues from the ones 
involved in control fraud or predation. To the extent that a CEO uses the 
firm as a weapon of predation, she typically does so in ways that increase 
reported earnings, boosting share prices and her own compensation.103 
This, of course, is exactly what boards who act to promote shareholder 
interests want.104 The CEO engaged in control fraud who uses managerial 
power to increase the appearance of firm profitability thereby enjoys 
greater freedom of action.105 If, instead, the CEO was acting to increase 
the honesty of the firm’s operations or to invest more in training or 
compensating employees at the expense of the firm’s short-term bottom 
line, the board would be more likely to object.106 CEO power, thus, 
constitutes “a one way ratchet”; it grows to the extent the CEO uses it to 
squeeze customers, creditors, and employees, increasing reported 
earnings, but it may diminish if used for other purposes. The shareholder 
primacy era increased the opportunities for control fraud for this and other 
reasons we discuss below. 
B. The Appearance of Legitimacy and Plausible Deniability 
All of the seminal work in white-collar criminology emphasizes the 
seeming legitimacy of the criminals. Indeed, Al Capone referred to such 
crimes as “the legitimate rackets.”107 Sutherland, in defining white-collar 
crime in terms of the betrayal of trust, recognized that the appearance of 
legitimacy was important to the creation of trust that could be betrayed.108 
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Wheeler and Rothman, in describing the organization as a “weapon,” 
treated it as a weapon whose power came from its seeming legitimacy.109 
Businesses engaged in predation also need to be able to command at 
least a measure of trust in order to exploit asymmetries in information. As 
Akerlof observed with respect to lemons markets, the disappearance of 
trust depresses prices across the entire market.110 Moreover, when 
companies like Goldman engage in systematic exploitation of customers, 
they often operate near the gray line that separates legal predation from 
fraud with uncertainty about the precise location of the dividing line 
insulating top executives from individual liability.111 Both objectives—
preserving legitimacy and avoiding liability—involve what some have 
called “plausible deniability.”112 
Charles Calomiris, a proponent of financial deregulation, used the 
term plausible deniability to describe what took place during the financial 
crisis.113 He described how at each step in the process of creating risky 
mortgage loans, bundling them into securities, and basing derivatives on 
the securities, the parties involved in creating and selling them overvalued 
the resulting instruments.114 The mortgage originators often encouraged 
borrowers to overstate their income. The investment bankers bundling and 
selling the mortgages used estimated default rates based on better quality 
mortgages.115 The rating agencies gave the securities triple-A ratings 
without taking loan quality or poor underwriting practices into account.116 
Even as evidence mounted that the market for these instruments was 
overvalued, those involved could rely on the stated income, estimated 
default rates, and agency ratings to plausibly deny just how overvalued the 
instruments were. The system, in fact, worked to defuse individual 
accountability for the results—and to keep inflating the housing bubble 
well beyond the point where there should have been a market correction.117 
Calomiris concluded that: 
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Plausible deniability may have been a coordinating device for 
allowing asset managers to participate in the feeding frenzy at little 
risk of losing customers (precisely because so many participated). 
Because asset managers could point to market-based data, and ratings 
at the time as confirming the prudence of their actions on a 
forward-looking basis, they were likely to bear little cost from 
investor losses.118 
Calomiris’s description explains how mortgage brokers, traders 
dealing in mortgage-backed securities, derivative originators, and others 
engaged in what should have been seen as predatory practices. They 
encouraged their customers to invest in products that finance professionals 
should have known were overvalued, secure in the belief that they would 
be able to profit from the “feeding frenzy” while bearing little 
responsibility for investor losses.119 
Those engaged in predation often create similar mechanisms within 
firms that provide incentives to engage in predatory practices while 
allowing senior officers and directors to maintain plausible deniability for 
the consequences. Hill and Painter conclude that the ability of institutions 
like Goldman to persist in such activities involves not only the type of 
“plausible deniability” that Calomiris describes but also the appearance of 
success—and of being known as the smartest bankers on Wall Street.120 
Control fraud often involves orchestrating prestige within and outside the 
firm to facilitate the unscrupulous practices—all while insulating the top 
corporate officials from knowledge of the details. In contrast, Ireland, 
following its financial crisis, has considered regulatory policies promoting 
healthier firm cultures rather than simply greater rule observance; it 
considered requiring greater individual accountability that would make it 
more difficult for senior officials to escape liability simply by claiming 
that they were unaware of wrongful acts by their subordinates.121 
C. Performance Pay 
One of the biggest changes to accompany the move from the 
managerial era to the shareholder value era is the change in executive 
compensation.122 Performance pay is an effective way for a CEO to take 
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charge of a company and reorient it to emphasize revised management 
objectives.123 Performance pay is also a valuable tool in priming corporate 
personnel to engage in predatory practices while preserving upper 
management’s plausible deniability.124 
The ability to use performance pay in this way increased with the 
move to shareholder value. During the managerial era, corporate officers 
often saw their role as company stewards who derived their individual 
prestige from the long-term success and growth of their companies.125 
John Kenneth Galbraith observed that, while corporate officers often did 
own stock or stock options in their companies, they rarely acted to advance 
their own pecuniary interests at the expense of the firm.126 Executives were 
expected to collaborate for the greater good of the company, not compete 
with each other for a cut of firm profits.127 The CEO’s income, which was 
not that much higher than that of other senior management officials, was 
substantially lower in relative terms than the CEO’s income today.128 In 
this environment, acting on self-interest was not what “a good company 
man” did; instead, corporate executives oriented their behavior in 
accordance with more holistic company objectives.129 
In the shareholder value era, executive compensation changed in two 
mutually reinforcing ways that placed greater emphasis on individual 
rewards. First, to better align management and shareholder interests, top 
management compensation packages began to emphasize incentive pay 
tied overwhelmingly to stock options.130 Between 1993 and 2014, the 
percentage of CEO compensation attributable to incentive pay increased 
from 35% to 85%,131 and CEOs also faced greater risk of dismissal if share 
prices did not increase.132 The overall disparities in the pay of top 
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executives at the same company increased,133 and between 1981 and 2013, 
the pay ratio between CEOs and average wage workers grew from 42:1 to 
331:1.134 
Complementing the greater emphasis on stock options and earnings-
related bonuses in the top management ranks was a second shift that 
emphasized greater use of incentive pay throughout the managerial ranks 
in much of corporate America. Performance pay came to apply to 
everything from Walmart store managers to used car sales personnel to 
mid-level executives to traders like Tourre.135 Jack Welch engineered one 
of the early forms of this type of evaluation system at General Electric 
(GE) in the 1980s.136 The system involves stack ranking, that is, a 
competitive evaluation system in which everyone is compared to everyone 
else, with approximately the top twenty percent given outsized bonuses 
and groomed for promotion, while the bottom ten percent is at risk of 
dismissal. Welch emphasized the need for “differentiation” among 
employees and bragged that he could get his employees to do anything 
management wanted by building it into the incentive system.137 Enron 
embraced the system, and former CEO Jeff Skilling used it to impose his 
personal stamp on the company.138 Bonuses could compose the bulk of 
employee pay, and every year’s bottom group was threatened with 
dismissal.139 
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Postmortems at Enron describe performance pay as a major factor in 
the creation of the company’s culture. Former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling 
“perpetuated a focus on short-term transactional endeavors from the very 
beginning by hiring employees that embodied the beliefs that he was trying 
to instill: aggressiveness, greed, a will to win at all costs, and an 
appreciation for circumventing the rules.”140 The behavior did not just 
involve workplace conduct—“Divorce rates among senior executives 
were skyrocketing as well.”141 These results reflected an emphasis on 
“[i]nstant gratification, both personally and professionally.”142 
Incentive pay makes it much easier to prime an organization for 
predation—or other kinds of fraud—while preserving management’s 
plausible deniability. All the CEO has to do is emphasize, as Jack Welch 
did, “hitting the numbers,” while not inquiring too closely into the methods 
used to produce results.143 In Welch’s case, hitting the numbers ordinarily 
meant beating earnings estimates. During Welch’s tenure, GE’s revenue 
grew 385%, while the company’s stock market value rose 4,000%.144 
Welch beat the estimates almost every quarter for two decades,145 and GE 
faced a major securities fraud investigation once he left.146 At Enron and 
other places, the result was “a win-at-all costs mentality, and a willingness 
to cross the ethical line.”147 
In the years since its adoption at GE, incentive pay has been 
associated with opportunistic and predatory behavior and, even in some 
cases, illegal actions “including earning manipulations, accounting frauds, 
and excessive risk-taking.”148 Some of the most striking examples of the 
use of bonus pay come from the financial sector. At Citigroup, for 
example, in the run up to the financial crisis, employee bonuses were tied 
to revenue generation; the bonuses either understated risk or did not factor 
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it in at all.149 William Dudley, former President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, concluded, “High-powered pay incentives linked to 
short-term profits, combined with a flexible and fluid job market, 
have . . . contributed to a lessening of firm loyalty—and, sometimes, to a 
disregard for the law—in an effort to generate larger bonuses.”150 
High stakes bonus cultures make it easy to prime a corporation for 
predation in reinforcing ways. First, they change the nature of the people 
attracted to the organization.151 Lynn Stout emphasizes that it is reasonable 
to expect “employers who rely on incentives to attract more than their 
share of opportunistic employees” only because employees willing to cut 
corners may see greater opportunities to profit from such environments.152 
Second, creating a work environment that attracts the unscrupulous tends 
to drive out others, creating the type of Gresham’s dynamic that Akerlof 
describes in the used car industry. Stout explains that “once a workplace 
begins to attract more than its share of relatively opportunistic or unethical 
employees, . . . it will also begin to repel the relatively prosocial and to 
subvert the prosocial employees who remain at the firm into committing 
their own ethical lapses.”153 Those who thrive in such environments tend 
to be simultaneously competitive and loyal, which requires a degree of 
“ethical plasticity”—that is, the ability “to construe what is self-serving to 
be reasonable, so that moral anxiety is buffered.”154 In addition, such 
companies often reward the unscrupulous, who quickly adapt to changing 
firm expectations without much resistance or guilt.155 Third, such an 
environment tends to normalize predatory behavior. Donald Langevoort 
observes that “corruption is usually a lengthy slide down a slippery slope, 
as small transgressions grow larger and larger without being checked early 
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enough either by external sanction or internal governance.”156 He 
concludes that at the outset, many participants would report their 
commitment to ethical conduct. After taking small initial ethically dubious 
actions, however, they become more likely to take larger ones, including 
the kinds of actions they would have opposed at the outset.157 They also 
become more likely to rationalize their behavior as acceptable. 
Criminologists describe this thinking as “neutralization” techniques.158 
Competitive pay makes all these factors easier to manipulate.159 The 
CEO determines the objectives that influences bonuses.160 These 
objectives often involve “meeting the numbers” without much regard to 
the process of getting there. Walmart, for example, fairly rigidly 
determines manager pay in accordance with a formula that takes total sales 
and divides it by labor costs.161 Supervisors who succeed in suppressing 
labor costs do not experience much scrutiny.162 Those who look out for 
their employees risk losing their jobs.163 The result contributes to labor 
practices that have made Walmart number one in the country for wage 
theft,164 generating over $200 million in fines in 2016 alone.165 And, 
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Walmart’s upper management can plausibly claim that it does not know 
about the individual practices that produce the wages and hours violations. 
In the meantime, management marginalizes dissenters by ranking them 
below par, and in competitive environments, they are soon gone. 
The managers who participate in this behavior may also identify 
more with each other and less with the employees that they are 
shortchanging, similar to how Goldman traders came to view their 
customers as marks.166 Lynne Dallas reports that competitive 
environments, despite their claim to merit, produce more politicized 
decision-making.167 Walmart, for instance, did not post managerial 
openings. Instead, existing managers identified the employees thought 
suitable for promotion and invited them to apply.168 These informal 
practices helped ensure that those selected would have the right mindset 
about the need to keep bonuses high and labor costs low without calling 
undue attention to Walmart’s methods. 
D. Shareholder Value and Short-termism 
The move to shareholder value involves a shift not just from the 
interests of multiple corporate stakeholders to those of shareholders alone, 
but also from long-term to short-term shareholder interests.169 
Performance pay, in turn, is linked to metrics that produce short-term 
increases in share price,170 with activist investors ready to challenge 
corporate management if they believe the corporation is undervalued.171 
The focus on short-term fluctuations in share price, like performance pay, 
has a series of overlapping effects that makes predation more likely.172 
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First, the emphasis on producing short-term results tends to shorten 
CEO and other executive tenure.173 That, in turn, creates even greater 
pressure to produce immediate results.174 The results—and the 
corresponding CEO bonus pay—become ends in themselves, defining 
success and determining status.175 The process encourages selection of 
narcissistic and overconfident CEOs determined to do whatever it takes to 
reorient the company to produce an immediate increase in profits.176 
Second, with shorter tenures, CEOs tend to focus on actions that can 
have an immediate impact, even if this weakens the firm’s long-term 
prospects. The savings and loan crisis in the 1980s involved business 
strategies guaranteed to bankrupt the thrifts—while making their owners 
incredibly rich in the process. As economists Akerlof and Romer noted, 
“[I]f the owners can extract more than the true economic value of the thrift, 
owners with a positive net worth will voluntarily choose to go bankrupt by 
extracting resources from it.”177 In other words, even the owners of 
otherwise profitable companies (those with a positive net worth) would 
chose to invest in enterprises with “a negative net present value”178 if by 
doing so they could justify “looting” their own firms.179 The more common 
examples of this involve a different kind of sleight of hand—the increase 
in share prices that benefits top management and short-term investors at 
the expense of those with longer time horizons. A 2005 survey of 401 
financial executives, for example, reported that seventy-eight of them 
would take actions that lowered the value of their companies to create a 
smooth earnings stream.180 Another study of executives in other industries 
found that the firms increased reported earnings by cutting support for 
research and development and marketing, even where such practices did 
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not advance the firms’ medium- to longer-term interests.181 Others firms, 
experiencing pressure to manipulate earnings, have engaged in outright 
fraud.182 
Third, it may persuade CEOs to adopt predatory practices that 
produce an immediate boost to earnings at the expense of other 
stakeholders183—or the company’s long-term reputation or profitability. 
Goldman arguably did exactly that when it sought to unload 
mortgage-backed securities at its customers’ expense as it realized that the 
housing market was about to tank in the run-up to the financial crisis.184 
So did Citigroup as it emphasized revenue growth without taking risk into 
account.185 Art Wilmarth describes how traders even had a term for the 
mindset: “IBGYBG, ‘I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.’ It referred to deals that 
brought in big fees up front while risking large losses in the future.”186 
The emphasis on shareholder value, implemented through practices 
that focus intensely on short-term results, increases the likelihood that 
CEOs will create environments that encourage predation. A Commission 
examining these issues in the wake of the Enron and World.com scandals 
found that: “In sum, executive compensation has become too ‘de-linked’ 
from long-term performance goals in many corporations. There is an 
imbalance between unprecedented levels of executive compensation, with 
little apparent financial downside risk or relationship of this compensation 
to long-term company performance.”187 After all, executives like Welch 
and hedge fund activists who join corporate boards to force short-term 
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boosts in earnings can keep their riches even if the company and its 
reputation suffer once they are gone.188 
E. The Negative Impact on Managerial Selection 
The selection not just of CEOs but of midlevel managers in corporate 
America should be something of a mystery. Extensive management 
literature identifies that the most effective managers are those with 
transformational, rather than transactional, leadership styles that are 
attentive to employee cohesion and morale.189 Yet, the emphasis on “bold” 
leadership, bottom-line transactional measures of merit, and zero-sum 
competitive pay and evaluation systems tend to produce managers who are 
less effective across a number of measures. Lynne Dallas concluded that 
systems that use rankings to justify large disparities in compensation tend 
to produce greater emphasis on self-interest, higher levels of distrust that 
undermine teamwork, greater homogeneity in the selection of corporate 
management, less managerial accountability, and more politicized 
decision-making.190 Kurt Eichenwald, in an in-depth study of what went 
wrong at Microsoft during Steve Ballmer’s tenure, attributed the 
company’s “lost decade” to its competitive evaluation system.191 
These negative assessments of competitive compensation systems 
began with the literature taking stock of corporate America in the wake of 
the Enron scandals. Ribstein concluded that the “rank and yank” era had 
produced a “new breed”: 
These executives are hyper-motivated survivors of a highly 
competitive tournament . . . who have proven their ability to make 
money while putting on a veneer of loyalty to the firm. At least some 
of the new breed appear to be Machiavellian, narcissistic, 
prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and 
moral distractions, willing to take great risk as the company moves 
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up and to lie when things turn bad, and nurtured by a corporate culture 
that instills loyalty to insiders, obsession with short-term stock price, 
and intense distrust of outsiders.192 
Ribstein suggested that this new breed did not have the commitment to 
“ethical custom” to which Friedman referred, and that the Enron-era 
scandals further suggested the securities markets did not effectively police 
corporate misfeasance, particularly efforts to misstate earnings and 
company health.193 
In the years since, the rank and yank evaluation system thought 
responsible for some of the excesses has declined in popularity,194 but most 
companies have simply abandoned the “yank” part of the system while 
keeping high stakes bonus systems at the upper end of the curve.195 
However, “hypercompetition” corresponds to the overrepresentation in the 
managerial ranks of executives who lack empathy or remorse.196 As 
Donald Langevoort observes, “[T]raits such as over-optimism, an inflated 
sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception 
are favored in corporate promotion tournaments.”197 They “are survival 
traits, not weaknesses, in a very Darwinian business world.”198 If these 
pathological traits are “Darwinian,” it follows that traits such as “a 
capacity for ethical self-deception” are “fitter” for firms who value and 
reward unethical behavior. 
Management psychologists, however, emphasize that a different set 
of characteristics is associated with the most effective leaders. In the early 
2000s, researchers revised the big five personality characteristics to 
include a new one, the “H factor.” The “H” stands for “honesty-humility,” 
and it measures sincerity, modesty, and fair-mindedness—traits that stand 
in opposition to greed, deceitfulness, pomposity, and rule-breaking.199 
Researchers find that those who rank low in the H factor are much more 
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willing than those with high levels to engage in unethical business 
practices.200 They also find that the executives who rate high in the H 
factor have compensation packages that are closer to standard employee 
pay—the opposite of the narcissists who tend to flourish in the corporate 
tournament.201 
These findings suggest that the traits that characterize modern 
corporate leadership have not just changed but have changed in ways that 
are counterproductive to the company’s long-term prospects. The results 
may reflect the shift from a focus on long-term effectiveness to short-term 
results, and from long-term company health to the interests of managers 
and investors more focused on immediate benefits for themselves. A new 
CEO, for example, chosen on the basis of his promises to produce an 
immediate turnaround, may use competitive evaluation systems to select 
for employees who will be loyal to him, and who will push through to get 
results in the face of ethical or legal constraints.202 These considerations 
may be that much greater if the CEO is selecting managers who will 
implement unspoken management objectives. Consider Michael Cohen’s 
response when the Congressional committee asked if Donald Trump had 
told him to engage in certain legally and ethically questionable activities, 
such as lying to Congress.203 Cohen’s response was that Trump did not 
need to ask him to do so directly; rather, Trump made clear what he wanted 
in other ways, and Cohen understood that his role in the Trump 
organization required the ability to decipher Trump’s intentions and 
implement them without being asked to do so directly.204 Having 
underlings who will do a CEO’s bidding without express instruction is 
particularly important if the CEO is eager to preserve the appearance of 
legitimacy—and plausible deniability. 
Corporations that select for charismatic CEOs who employ 
competitive bonus systems to push through transformations and focus 
attention on short-term results are, of course, not all engaged in fraud or 
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predation. But with the normalization of these practices, corporations are 
primed to implement business models that do involve such activities. The 
executives encouraging predation do not necessarily act in unusual ways, 
nor do they adopt unusual methods. These executives are not easily 
detectable to those outside of the business itself and further normalize the 
predation. This very normalization, however, makes it unlikely that 
“ethical custom” or the market will police unacceptable practices. 
In addition, during this same period, what we have referred to 
elsewhere as the “Three D’s”—Decriminalization, Deregulation, and 
Desupervision—contribute to an environment that increases corporate 
ability to exploit “gray areas” of uncertain legality or enforceability.205 The 
result resembles what economist Frédéric Bastiat described in the 
eighteenth century when he observed that “[w]hen plunder becomes a way 
of life for a group of men in a society, over the course of time they create 
for themselves a legal system that authorizes it and a moral code that 
glorifies it.”206 
F. When Plunder Becomes a Way of Life 
The factors criminologists emphasize in explaining white-collar 
crime—the tone set at the top, the use of the corporation to promote the 
appearance of legitimacy, the role of incentives in priming corporate 
behavior, and the ability to exploit asymmetries in information and power 
to the disadvantage of shareholders, customers, and employees—are not 
new. All existed during the eras that influenced Berle, Sutherland, and 
Wheeler. What has changed is the role of the shareholder value model and 
modern executive compensation in systematizing these elements across a 
broader swath of corporate America and the changing legal infrastructure 
that reduces individual accountability for the results. Both changes 
contribute to the construction of corporate cultures established to facilitate 
predation. 
To illustrate the combination of short-termism and legal impunity, 
consider two predatory business models made possible by the weakening 
of the oversight that once kept such activities in check. Start with finance. 
In Infectious Greed, Frank Partnoy explained that three major changes 
have remade finance since the mid-1980s in ways Bastiat might have 
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predicted. First, “financial instruments became increasingly complex and 
were pushed underground, as more parties used financial engineering to 
manipulate earnings and to avoid regulation.”207 In short, opportunities for 
exploiting asymmetric information increased both the ability to engage in 
predatory behavior and to evade accountability. Second, “control and 
ownership of companies moved greater distances apart,”208 increasing 
management’s ability to take advantage of shareholders and its difficulty 
in supervising employees, for better and ill.209 This change in corporate 
management has increased the degree of plausible deniability, insulating 
senior executives from accountability. Third, “markets were deregulated, 
and prosecutors rarely punished financial malfeasance.”210 That is, as 
Bastiat suggested, the legal system increasingly tolerated predatory 
behavior211 and, as Hill and Painter explain, the ability to be seen as the 
smartest bankers on Wall Street brought glory rather than opprobrium.212 
By the time of the financial crisis, the bankers had become “too big to 
jail.”213 Plausible deniability and the routinization of predatory practices 
meant that, while many were complicit, no one was accountable. 
A second example involves predation on employees. Walmart has 
long been the poster child for wage theft, having been penalized more for 
cheating its workers than any other company in the country.214 Given 
chronic understaffing, company policy against paying overtime, and 
bonuses tied to the suppression of labor costs, some managers pressure 
workers to clock out and then go back to work or to continue working 
through breaks or lunch hours without giving the employees credit for the 
extra work.215 Other managers simply “adjust” the time cards of workers 
who report more than forty hours in a week, unilaterally adding rest breaks 
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or increasing meal periods.216 These activities violate wage and hour laws 
and deprive employees of compensation owed for hours worked. Between 
2000 and 2014, Walmart spent over $80 million on lobbying and campaign 
contributions,217 donating to 295 different candidates in one election year 
alone. These contributions have contributed to a political willingness to 
gut wages and hours protection. Congressional Republicans, for example, 
have unanimously voted against minimum wage increases in recent 
Congresses, despite 78% public support for a higher rate, contributing to 
the erosion of the value of the minimum wage.218 The beneficiaries of these 
contributions, which include the Bush family, have appointed union 
hostile labor regulators. Indeed, President George W. Bush dismissed the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) General Counsel only days 
before he was to argue a major case against Walmart. The successor Bush 
nominated dropped the case, despite extensive evidence of Walmart’s use 
of illegal tactics in fighting unionization of its stores during the 
unionization campaign in the late 1990s.219 Since then, both Trump 
appointees and conservative Supreme Court appointees220 have further 
undercut labor enforcement.221 
Deregulation and weak enforcement have contributed to a 
company’s ability to maintain the seeming legitimacy of its practices while 
cloaking the improprieties from view. The combination of a management 
ethos that encourages a predatory mindset and a public ethos that 
normalizes it makes it easier, as Akerlof and Shiller have claimed, for 
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companies to profit from predatory practices. Overall, this reinforces the 
image of these companies as successful and further spurs the internal 
competitions for promotions and bonuses, creating predatory, if not 
always criminogenic, corporate cultures. 
III. PREDATION, GENDER, AND WOMEN AS THE  
CANARIES IN THE COAL MINE 
The gendered wage gap shrank over the course of the 1970s and 
1980s,222 but in the 1990s, something began to change. In 1990, the gender 
wage gap had little relationship to education levels.223 To the extent that 
there were differences, women with college degrees earned a higher 
percentage of the wage for comparably educated men than did 
less-educated women.224 Over the next twenty years, while the overall 
gender gap in wages continued to shrink, it increased for college 
graduates.225 The overall numbers cloaked the fact that, by 2010, 
college-educated women were making a smaller share of the male wage 
than they had in 1990.226 What happened? 
The answer is that income inequality grew dramatically in the United 
States, and in the areas where income grew the most—particularly finance, 
tech, and the top corporate ranks—women lost ground.227 The percentage 
of women on Wall Street and in tech jobs declined after the 1990s, and the 
six job categories with the greatest gender gaps in compensation were all 
in finance.228 In short, women fell behind in the sectors of the economy 
where incentive pay—and opportunities for predation—took hold. These 
also happened to be the sectors of the economy enjoying the greatest 
overall income growth. During the same period, however, companies with 
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greater gender diversity outperformed other companies. A study of almost 
22,000 companies reported that businesses with more equal gender 
leadership have a “15 percent boost to profitability.”229 Empirical studies 
further suggest corporate boards that include more women appear to 
produce better results, and women-run funds outperform those run by 
men.230 Businesses with greater gender diversity appear to operate in 
different ways, with different values, and with better results than more 
homogeneous firms. 
In this Part, we will first explore how gender theory postulates that 
the shareholder value and competitive pay era have produced “masculinity 
contest cultures” in which employees compete to demonstrate the most 
masculine traits. These cultures make winning at all cost the test of 
success, and tolerate self-interested, unethical, and counterproductive 
behavior. These cultures also tend to increase workplace bullying, sexual 
harassment, and inattention to morale, which drives women from the 
workplaces, further reinforcing male dominance in such cultures. Second, 
we will consider how these traits align greater male domination with 
predatory cultures. Third, we explain how these practices constitute a 
triple bind for women: they cannot win if they do not engage in the same 
unethical behavior as men, they are punished more severely when they do 
engage in the same behavior, and they become less likely to apply when 
they see the women ahead of them fail to succeed. Finally, we will 
conclude that anti-discrimination efforts are not well-suited to address the 
gender disparities, partly because they tend to assume the legitimacy of 
business objectives and methods and partly because they depend on 
comparisons in the treatment of like workers in workplaces that 
increasingly treat all management-level employees on an individual basis. 
The result is that the same factors that encourage predation also tend to 
exacerbate gender disparities in the workplace, making women canaries in 
the coal mine for toxic workplace cultures. 
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A. Gender Theory and Masculinity Contest Cultures 
Gender theorists have put together a body of empirical work that they 
use to identify “masculinity contest cultures.”231 To do so, these theorists 
have taken the experience with competitive workplace cultures and 
recharacterized it in gendered terms. In the process, they emphasize the 
ways that the terms of competition are often artificial and increase male 
dominance in the workplace, and that workplaces characterized by these 
masculinity contest cultures tend to result in lower morale, greater 
willingness to engage in unethical practices, and more sexual harassment 
and bullying. Gender theorists characterize such workplaces as 
environments where the celebration of extreme masculine traits becomes 
an end in itself, defining the workplace ideal in stereotypically male 
terms.232 We argue, however, that the promotion of these traits also serves 
to refocus workplaces on predatory ends, and therefore may be understood 
as something more than simply gender stereotyping or misogyny. 
Feminists, of course, have long sought to explore “patriarchy” as the 
assertion of male power over women.233 More recently, masculinities 
theorists have emphasized that patriarchy is also a system that valorizes 
the creation of hierarchies that give men power over other men.234 
Competition, uncertainty, and high-stakes rewards increase both the 
intensity of the fight and the consequences of ending up at the losing end 
of male status hierarchies.235 CEOs who use zero sum bonus systems to 
gain control of a company by definition increase competition, and to the 
extent that they focus it on short-term metrics, they also increase 
uncertainty and insecurity, intensifying the effect.236 This theory suggests 
that those in power gain a greater ability to manipulate workplace cultures 
by dismantling what had been state-sponsored sources of security and 
stability (e.g., union power and labor protections) and standardization of 
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ethical custom and workplace procedures. Walmart, for example, has long 
waged anti-union efforts,237 correctly perceiving that labor unions would 
make it more difficult to evade wage and hour laws, and in today’s 
workplaces, anti-discrimination protections.238 
In contrast, competitive cultures tend to create systems of 
personalized, rather than institutionalized power. Employees focus on the 
internal contests, which involve prevailing over those in the next cubicles, 
rather than working together to best external rivals, such as other 
companies.239 These contests then select for stereotypically masculine 
traits, which can become ends in themselves.240 “In this zero-sum game,” 
the scholars explain, “men compete at work for dominance by showing no 
weakness, demonstrating a single-minded focus on professional success, 
displaying physical endurance and strength, and engaging in cut-throat 
competition.”241 
These environments work to the disadvantage of women—and often 
the organization—in a variety of ways. First, they typically emphasize 
confidence to the point of hubris. Jack Welch, in describing the selection 
of his successor, bragged that all of the candidates “thrived on change and 
had self-confidence to spare.”242 Yet, in an article entitled Why Do So 
Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?, organizational psychologist 
Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic observed that “when it comes to leadership, 
the only advantage that men have over women . . . is the fact that 
manifestations of hubris—often masked as charisma or charm—are 
commonly mistaken for leadership potential, and that these occur 
much more frequently in men than in women.”243 
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Second, they emphasize the willingness to work long hours, often as 
a demonstration of commitment to the job rather than as a reflection of 
business needs.244 As high-stakes competitions in the workplace have 
increased, hours have also increased, mostly at the top of the income 
ladder.245 At mid-century, blue-collar and white-collar workers worked 
about the same number of hours,246 while today, the highest earners work 
much longer hours than anyone else.247 This emphasis on long hours 
disproportionately affects women, given their greater family 
responsibilities.248 In addition, the appearance of working long hours may 
matter more than productivity; one study found that men were three times 
more likely than women to ease up on hours without having it affect their 
performance reviews—superiors were more likely to view men rather than 
women as dedicated to the job.249 
Third, the emphasis on the ability to engage in “cut-throat 
competition” bolsters in-group favoritism. Gender theorists emphasize 
that competitive environments attract those drawn to the ability to exercise 
the type of dominance associated with masculinity displays, but such 
environments also involve constant threats to the ability to maintain 
favored status.250 These scholars conclude, “The need to repeatedly prove 
masculinity can lead men to behave aggressively, embrace risky 
behaviors, sexually harass women (or other men), and express 
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homophobic attitudes, when men feel that their masculinity is 
threatened.”251 The masculinities context studies find, specifically, that 
such cultures produce abusive managers, more eager to demonstrate their 
own success than to encourage workplace harmony or productivity.252 
They tend to identify with the workers who have the same traits they see 
in themselves, and to exploit others’ weaknesses, leading to the “exclusion 
and harassment toward historically disadvantaged groups and men with 
resistant masculinities.”253 The very idea of a masculinity contest involves 
selection for the traits because they are associated with masculinity rather 
than because they are valuable to the task at hand.254 Thus, Mary Anne 
Case demonstrated how police departments choose officers for traits such 
as aggressiveness, self-assuredness, and reliance on physical strength even 
when empirical research suggests that such traits are counterproductive, 
and officers with traits more likely to defuse conflict do a better job.255 
These types of environments tend to promote those winning the 
masculinity contest—that is, those displaying aggressiveness, strength, 
endurance, and hubris—and to overlook the downside of these traits, 
which includes higher turnover and lower morale.256 Scholars further 
report that workers in such environments are more likely to experience 
sexual or racial harassment and to report a more sexist workplace 
culture.257 
The result both reinforces gender stereotyping by identifying the 
ideal worker with a male image and creating workforce cultures that drive 
out women and other outsiders.258 It also creates an atmosphere easy to 
manipulate to produce predation; indeed, that may be why upper 
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management tolerates the downside of these traits. Moreover, focusing on 
the role of these cultures in predation changes the description of the 
dynamics involved in creating the culture. Gender theorists describe them 
as “zero-sum” contests; if one person “wins,” another necessarily loses. 
For the company, however, they are often “negative-sum.” That is, the 
form the competition takes may lower overall productivity.259 Such 
competitions may harm teamwork and select and promote the worst 
officers.260 In addition, while high-stakes corporate tournaments are often 
described as “winner-take-all” contests, male CEOs create handpicked 
teams and often richly reward the teams that support the CEO’s 
predations.261 
B. Predation and Masculinities Contests 
Predation, almost by definition, involves callousness toward its 
targets. Studies of gender differences in leadership, on the other hand, tend 
to emphasize greater social awareness and empathy as the traits women 
are more likely to bring to management. Yet, more predatory 
environments favor managers who lack such qualities, and the result 
contributes to gender disparities both in the selection of top management, 
as well as women’s promotion and success within such companies.262 
Essential to the creation of such cultures is competition that pits 
employee against employee.263 Even adopting competitive pay schemes 
tends to change the nature of those who apply, attracting overconfident 
narcissists264 and depressing women’s applications to a much greater 
degree than men’s.265 Granted, women can be narcissists, and both male 
and female narcissists like to be the center of attention.266 Nonetheless, 
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male narcissists are more likely than female narcissists to be attracted to 
positions of power and authority, and thus more likely to seek leadership 
positions.267 The largest gender differences among narcissists, however, 
involve the greater willingness of the men “to exploit others and to believe 
that they themselves are special and therefore entitled to privileges.”268 In 
short, male narcissists are more willing than female narcissists to demand 
greater rewards for themselves and to use greater status to run roughshod 
over others to accomplish their objectives.269 Narcissists who think in 
these terms tend to view compensation as a measure of merit, to feel that 
the compensation they receive is justified, and to use whatever tactics they 
have at their disposal to increase their leverage in negotiations.270 A study 
of tech firms found that the CEOs whose employees ranked the CEOs 
higher in narcissistic traits received “more total direct compensation 
(salary, bonus, and stock options), have more money in their total 
shareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher) 
compensation and the other members of their team.”271 These qualities are 
almost exactly the opposite of the humility-honesty factor traits associated 
with the most effective leaders.272 
These factors create self-reinforcing cycles: a company that wishes 
to encourage wage suppression, higher sales based on misinformation or 
pressure tactics, or other ethically dubious practices may use incentive pay 
to encourage the results.273 Negative-sum workplace incentives, however, 
will increase the representation of narcissists and discourage women 
generally from applying.274 The male narcissists will use harder tactics in 
negotiating pay and be more willing to cut ethical corners to increase their 
bonuses—increasing pay disparities.275 At the same time, those who thrive 
in such environments tend to be more likely to harass and bully their 
employees, particularly women and other outsiders, driving them out and 
decreasing workplace diversity. These workplaces then become even more 
male dominant—and more willing to engage in predatory practices. The 
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male dominance may be an incidental rather than an intended consequence 
of the efforts to incentivize predatory practices. 
Let us return, for example, to Walmart and examine how it recruited 
a managerial force willing to exploit and shortchange workers. In a 
national class action case alleging sex discrimination against Walmart,276 
the plaintiffs demonstrated that women made up more than two-thirds of 
Walmart’s hourly employees and almost ninety percent of its customer 
services managers (an hourly position), but constituted less than twenty 
percent of salaried store managers at the time the case was brought.277 
Women promoted into the supervisory ranks earned substantially less than 
the men.278 Walmart’s informal selection process and insistence that 
managers work long and unpredictable hours provide part of the 
explanation for the gender disparities.279 Walmart also, however, based a 
high percentage of managerial pay on a bonus system, typically fired ten 
percent or more of store managers even in good years, and required as a 
condition of selection for its managerial trainee program that the 
candidates be willing to move.280 
Even Sam Walton acknowledged that the requirement “really put 
good, smart women at a disadvantage in our company because at that time 
they weren’t as free to pick up and move as many men were.”281 The 
advantage for Walmart is that managers who move repeatedly do not 
develop overly close ties to the employees they supervise, their individual 
stores, or the communities in which they live.282 They identify instead with 
their status as a successful Walmart manager, which may be particularly 
important in a corporate culture that emphasizes the suppression of labor 
costs.283 In such a system, self-promotion at the expense of employees and 
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callousness and lack of empathy become a condition of employment for a 
managerial force in a constant state of insecurity. This Walmart system 
can be (and was) presented as an Arkansas old boys’ club, with trips to 
Hooters and the promotion of men over women because of sex-
stereotyping,284 but it can also be seen as a sophisticated effort to promote 
managers willing to engage in wage theft without explicit direction from 
Bentonville. 
Finance, of course, is even more notorious for its predatory attitudes 
toward customers. Frank Partnoy recalled how the bankers he worked with 
used to refer to “ripping clients’ faces off,” which meant making high fees 
selling the clients something they did not understand.285 The more striking 
attitudes, however, may be those of personal financial advisers. Unlike 
traders and many investment bankers, personal financial advisers typically 
have ongoing relationships with their clients. The desired traits for 
financial advising and wealth management include building relationships 
and strong communication skills—qualities often associated with 
women.286 Yet, relatively few wealth managers are women,287 and 
personal financial advisors show the largest gender gaps in compensation 
in the entire economy.288 Compensation is an oft-cited reason for the 
gender disparities; financial advisors tend to be paid based on “the amount 
of assets under management . . . or by commissions on product sales, as 
opposed to less tangible outcomes such as client satisfaction.”289 
The fee structure together with the relative lack of regulatory 
oversight invites predatory behavior—and uses success in exploiting 
predation as the measure of workplace success. Critics conclude that “[t]he 
regulatory structure for financial advice now tolerates incentives 
motivating financial advisors to manipulate and deceive retail 
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investors.”290 Benjamin Edwards observes more bluntly that 
“[c]ommission compensation structures may lead even well-meaning 
financial advisors to recommend unwise investments to their clients.”291 
Edwards describes the way advisors may persuade clients to purchase 
products that offer higher sales commissions or involve greater adviser 
involvement tied to higher fees.292 He estimates the losses to ordinary 
savers from such conduct at $17 billion per year.293 
Perhaps the most egregious recent example of such conduct comes 
from Wells Fargo. A former Wells Fargo employee explained that “the 
whole foundation of Wells Fargo is cross-sell, cross-sell, cross-sell,”294 
which builds in conflicts of interest between advisers and customers. The 
bank generated enormous pressure on its employees to persuade customers 
to purchase additional Wells Fargo services, particularly services likely to 
generate overdraft or other fees.295 Most infamously, Wells Fargo opened 
accounts in its customers’ names without their knowledge or 
permission.296 While that has presumably stopped, a survey of Wells Fargo 
workers in March 2019 indicated that “they remain under heavy pressure 
to squeeze extra money out of customers.”297 The New York Times 
reported that “[s]ome have witnessed colleagues bending or breaking 
internal rules to meet ambitious performance goals.”298 One of the former 
Wells Fargo bankers commented, “The analogy I use was that it was like 
lions hunting zebras . . . . They would look for the weakest, the ones that 
would put up the least resistance.”299 The wealth management unit 
responsible for some of the worst abuses is now also subject to an ongoing 
sex discrimination case.300 And as we will explain in the next Part, the 
gender disparities in attrition are striking. 
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Masculinities contest cultures tend to attract those who thrive on 
competition, value compensation as a measure of self-worth, and enjoy the 
ability to assert dominance even at the expense of subordinates and 
customers. The selection for these traits favors men over women; it also 
makes it easier to prime such cultures for predatory activities. 
C. The Triple Bind: Competition, Predation, and Punishment 
The conventional discussion of why women are so underrepresented 
in fields like finance maintains that women just do not like competition 
and disproportionately fail to apply for positions in high stakes 
competitive cultures.301 In fact, as we have suggested above, women have 
good reason to believe that such cultures will be less supportive for them 
personally. In addition, if the cultures encourage predatory behavior—
against shareholders, customers, subordinates, or co-workers—women 
may find that they are more likely than men to be punished for engaging 
in such behavior. 
The literature on competition does show marked gender differences. 
Laboratory studies using a general population find that women prefer less 
competitive reward structures.302 When given a choice, for example, 
between performing a task on a non-competitive piece-rate basis versus in 
a contest, 73% of the men selected the contest while only 35% of the 
women did so.303 Other studies find that it may not be competition per se, 
but the purpose of the competition that produces the greatest gender 
differences. One study distinguished between “hypercompetitives,” who 
were more likely to be male, versus “personal development competitives,” 
who were more likely to be female. The hypercompetitives endorsed the 
value of power and control over others while the personal development 
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competitives “strongly endorsed values associated with social concern, 
that is, with caring about the well-being of others and with treating them 
with respect and as equals.”304 Not all competition is the same. 
The way a position is constructed and advertised in these terms 
influences the gender composition of the applicant pool. Indeed, simply 
emphasizing monetary incentives rather than teamwork or customer 
satisfaction increases the percentage of male applicants.305 So does 
advertising that emphasizes a competitive environment generally.306 When 
ads indicate that a large fraction of the wage (50%) depends on relative 
performance, the gender gap in applications doubles,307 indicating a much 
greater female aversion to such environments rather than simply an 
aversion to competition by itself.308 
The reason may have something to do with what we have described 
elsewhere as the “triple bind.”309 The analysis starts with the classic double 
bind. If women engage in the same predatory behavior as men, they are 
judged harshly for not conforming to gender stereotypes,310 but if they fail 
to do so, they may be viewed as lacking what it takes to succeed in 
competitive environments.311 Our analysis then adds a third factor: women 
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become less likely to apply for such positions, increasing male dominance 
within the workplace.312 
Mark Egan, of the Harvard Business School, and his colleagues 
provide a particularly telling example in their description of misconduct 
among personal financial advisers—the job category that, as we 
mentioned above, has the largest gender gap in compensation in the 
economy. The study notes that misconduct in the industry is prevalent: 
“Roughly 7% of financial advisers have a past record of misconduct.”313 
The incidence of misconduct is gendered. Men are three times more likely 
than women to engage in misconduct and twice as likely to be repeat 
offenders. In addition, their offenses are 20% more costly to their 
employers.314 Yet, women are 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30% 
less likely to find new ones compared to men.315 In addition, the source of 
the complaints for men and women differ. Customers initiate 55% of the 
misconduct complaints against men while their employers initiate 28%. 
For women, on the other hand, employer-initiated instances of misconduct 
are almost as common as customer-initiated complaints (41% versus 44%, 
respectively).316 In an industry in which predation against customers is 
common and male domination of senior management is the norm, women 
face greater risks than men—and a significant portion of those risks come 
from their employers.317 
The data the study provided identified the financial institutions with 
the greatest gender gaps and generated headlines in the financial press with 
the finding that “female financial planners at Wells Fargo were more than 
25% more likely to experience a ‘job separation’ after misconduct than 
their male counterparts.”318 The combination of predatory behavior and 
gender disparities appears to have been particularly intense at Wells Fargo, 
the bank whose employees described themselves as “lions hunting 
zebras.”319 
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Overall, numerous studies indicate that women are more likely than 
men to support ethical business practices.320 While there is no agreement 
on why, an easy conclusion is that women may have little choice. They do 
not profit as much from the upsides of competitive—or predatory—
environments, and they face potentially more severe consequences for 
their misdeeds when they do try to cash in.321 
D. Anti-discrimination Laws Provide Little Redress 
While masculinity contest cultures produce notable gender 
disparities, anti-discrimination laws do not provide adequate redress for 
three reasons. First, the courts have consistently cut back on the ability to 
redress sex discrimination generally. Second, the courts tend to treat 
business practices as legitimate and do not generally look beyond 
employers’ stated reasons for their practices. Third, the shift from lockstep 
raises and promotions to more individualized assessments makes unequal 
treatment hard to prove. As a result, while anti-discrimination efforts 
might be expected to shed greater light on the intersections between 
predatory cultures and the negative impact on women, in fact, they do so 
much less than highly publicized incidents, as we saw in the #MeToo 
movement. 
The first factor, the consistent undermining of anti-discrimination 
law, has been well-documented.322 The Supreme Court has, for example, 
made class action treatment more difficult, upheld mandatory arbitration 
provisions, and generally interpreted statutory causes of action 
                                                     
Were Scapegoated for Accounts Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/business 
/la-fi-wells-fargo-termination-20170901-story.html [https://perma.cc/VA8S-P8ZG] (describing 
lawsuit alleging that Wells Fargo tried to blame fake accounts on male and female employees who 
had complained about them, while protecting higher up males who bore greater responsibility). 
 320. See Egan et al., supra note 11, at 8–10; see also Damodar Suar & Jyotiranjan Gochhayat, 
Influence of Biological Sex and Gender Roles on Ethicality, 134 J. BUS. ETHICS 199, 200 (2016) (“In 
a meta-analysis of 14 studies, women were found to be more ethical than men in seven of the studies, 
and no difference was observed in seven other studies (Ford and Richardson 1994). In another meta-
analytic study of 66 pre-career student samples, women were found to have higher ethical standards 
than men, but the difference between women and men declined as work experience increased (Franke 
et al. 1997). In still another meta-analysis of 47 studies, 49% of the studies yielded a difference 
between women and men in ethical behavior, 34% yielded no difference, and 17% provided mixed 
results (Borkowski and Ugras 1998). Furthermore, in a qualitative review of the literature, while 
some studies showed little or no difference between men and women, none found higher standards 
of ethicality among men than among women (Kennedy and Lawton 1996). Combining the empirical, 
meta-analytic, and qualitative studies, the weight of the evidence suggests that women are more 
ethical than men.”). 
 321. See, e.g., CORDELIA FINE, TESTOSTERONE REX: MYTHS OF SEX, SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY 
121 (2017) (indicating that women are less likely to take risks for career success in part because they 
had lower expectations of success). 
 322. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 220, at 1449 (documenting the pro-business bias of 
Republican appointees to the Supreme Court in an empirical study). 
492 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:441 
narrowly.323 Moreover, the widespread use of non-disclosure agreements 
makes discrimination cases less effective in casting light on workplace 
abuses.324 The legal shift is part of a more general shift favoring employers 
over workers and undercutting regulation in a variety of arenas.325 
Second, anti-discrimination cases tend to assume the legitimacy of 
the employers’ underlying business model, focusing exclusively on 
unequal treatment of the protected group.326 In the Walmart litigation, for 
example, an extensive literature describes the company’s union and wage 
suppression activities.327 Further, the trial court’s eighty-four page opinion 
extensively details the companies’ gender disparities, but does not discuss 
the links between the policies such as frequent moves that disadvantage 
women and wage suppression. Our research is the first that we have found 
that explores the links between the two.328 The dilemma for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers is that the more a company’s actions appear tied to its business 
model, the less those actions may appear to be motivated by discrimination 
against women—and that, of course, may be true. Walmart may have 
remained firm on insisting managerial moves, for example, long after it 
realized that it restricted the number of women managers for reasons that 
have very little to do with animus against women per se. Yet, Walmart 
may also have been reluctant to publicly discuss the real reasons for the 
policy, which encouraged managers not to identify with line employees 
and thus gave Walmart a way of implementing national policies promoting 
predatory labor practices while preserving upper management’s plausible 
deniability.329 A broader approach to either class certification or disparate 
impact litigation might have focused more attention on such policies.330 In 
another example, a gender discrimination class action against Microsoft 
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survived preliminary defense motions on the basis of the gender disparities 
involved in implementing its rank and yank evaluation system.331 The 
case, even in its preliminary stages, generated unfavorable publicity on the 
consequences of the competitive evaluation system, and persuaded 
Microsoft to abandon it for reasons that may have little to do with its 
impact on women.332 Yet, winning such cases is difficult, and some 
scholars even maintain that the focus on the propriety of the business 
practices is not the purpose of anti-discrimination law.333 
Third, the shift from lockstep promotions and raises to individualized 
evaluations and competitive pay makes disparate treatment on the basis of 
gender harder to establish. Individual anti-discrimination claims must 
show that the plaintiff was treated differently from a comparator because 
of her sex.334 Yet, in workplaces where no two executives perform exactly 
the same job or receive the same compensation, finding an appropriate 
comparator and showing that the differences in treatment are due to 
impermissible discrimination can be extremely difficult.335 Courts narrow 
the focus in these cases to the specific basis for the plaintiff’s lack of a 
promotion or bonus; they do not generally consider issues such as why a 
bonus system was structured to reward revenue generation without taking 
risk into account.336 And juries tend to view workplace success as 
reflecting meritocratic judgments.337 The individualized nature of a 
competitive pay system may obscure the discriminatory impact in much 
the same way it may obscure the incentives for predation.338 
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Ironically, this has made the #MeToo movement, which sparked a 
public uproar about serial sexual harassers, more effective than litigation 
in confronting abuses of power. Culprits like Roger Ailes, the head of Fox 
News, and Harvey Weinstein, a prominent film producer, engaged in 
abuses of power for decades339 in both their corporate and sexual realms 
before egregious charges prompted their resignations.340 In a similar 
fashion, it was sexual harassment allegations that forced out Uber head 
Travis Kalanick, but the abuses in Uber’s management ethos extended 
well beyond the harassment charges.341 These high profile sexual 
harassment cases in many ways capture the intersection of predatory 
business models and masculinity contest cultures better than any existing 
anti-discrimination efforts; seeing the connections between the two sheds 
a powerful light on how predatory workplaces manipulate and exploit both 
corporate and personal power. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has addressed the ways that priming a corporation to 
exploit asymmetries in information and power for the purpose of profit 
maximization can create predatory cultures. Such cultures promote 
individualism at the expense of institutional loyalty, generate short-term 
earnings and share price increases at the expense of long-term company 
health, and create workplaces hostile to women and other outsiders. They 
may also undermine a variety of social ends, from confidence in markets 
to productivity to gender equity. 
These conclusions suggest that corporate management and external 
regulations should be thought of together. In a society with strong 
regulation of predatory practices, executive interests would align more 
closely with creating ethical business cultures. 
The analysis also suggests reconsideration of the role of gender in 
creating and policing workplace cultures. This is a difficult issue. On the 
one hand, most studies of existing managers find women to be more 
ethical, more altruistic, and more attentive to group cohesion and well-
being.342 On the other hand, as Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes 
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demonstrates, there are any number of narcissistic and Machiavellian 
women willing to enter the tournament.343 Touting women’s advantages 
or promoting them as a solution (“add women and stir”) risks reinforcing 
existing sex stereotypes without fully taking on the reasons for these 
cultures.344 
We argue instead for a miners’ canary approach. The reason that 
more diverse firms do better than homogenous ones may be that 
maintaining diverse workforces requires greater cooperation and trust, and 
adherence to the “rules of society . . . embodied in ethical custom”345—
factors that improve the operation of most firms.346 Doing so in a large 
corporation involves not just substantive integrity but also procedural 
regularity. At one time, we have called the process “bureaucratization” and 
it would have been a positive term. Today, we prefer the word 
“institutionalization,” and more generally, “the rule of law.” Those 
engaged in predation are likely to bristle at the thought of corporate 
officials or government regulators who get in the way of their objectives. 
Sam Walton had no use for human resources (HR) specialists who would 
have objected to wages and hours violations. Jack Welch held little respect 
for auditors, who almost certainly would have objected to securities fraud. 
Travis Kalnick, much like the rest of Silicon Valley start-up CEOs, is 
unlikely to have listened to his HR specialists. Yet, adopting and 
maintaining transparent and consistent rules and values tends to promote 
both more successful institutional cultures and the ability to manage 
diverse workplaces. 
Neither shareholder primacy nor competitive pay need to be 
abolished in their entirety. Instead, greater attention has to be paid to 
establishing the “rules of the game” in transparent and consistent ways. 
Shareholder value cannot promote greater societal well-being if it 
produces short-term profit maximization through acts of predation likely 
to spark public outcry or the collapse of the firm because of the lack of 
internal controls that promote long-term sustainability.347 And, in this 
context, diversity can be framed as a public good. Lack of it ought to 
trigger greater scrutiny. The scrutiny should focus on something more than 
whether company officials engaged in intentional discrimination. Instead, 
the scrutiny should determine whether management culture invites 
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politicization and favoritism that works to the exclusion of outsiders and 
the lack of management accountability. Ultimately, the principle that 
should govern is management responsibility for the predictable 
consequences of its acts. Without plausible deniability, predation would 
become a much less successful practice. 
 
